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INTRODUCTION
The articles presented here portray several different conceptions
of the relationship between the realm of formal state law and the
realm of social norms-as well as various views on what economic
analysis might contribute to our knowledge of that relationship.
Robert Ellickson's pathbreaking work describes two parallel
domains, largely segregated from and irrelevant to each other; the
norms of Shasta County arise and are maintained not in the shadow
of the law, but in ignorance of it.' Robert Cooter offers a more
normative and synthetic vision, but it is a synthesis in which state
law should understand itself primarily as the passive, Hayekian
reflector of a dynamic, creative domain of social norms formed
under the appropriate decentralized and efficiency-tending
conditions.2 A third view emerges from several members of what
might be called the Pennsylvania contingent (that this convergence
arises from discrete empirical studies of seemingly disparate fields,
such as commercial law and labor law, makes these findings
particularly provocative). On this third view, state law and social
norms are still viewed as parallel, separate domains; yet both are
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. The influence of
conversations with my colleague Rick Hills is pervasive throughout this Comment.
I See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTEs (1991).2 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1694-95
(1996) (arguing that the lawmaker's role should be to find community norms, apply
structural tests to determine whether these norms have developed under efficiency-
tending conditions, and then enforce those norms that pass this structural test).
3 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766-71
(1996) (arguing that the UCC's underlying philosophy of using immanent business
norms to decide cases undermines merchants' implicit reliance on the distinc-
tion between relationship-preserving and endgame norms); Jason S. Johnston, The
Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1859, 1859-1868 (1996) (arguing that the Statute of Frauds's writing
requirement should not be abolished because parties rely upon it in non-repeat
transactions, although it does not affect their ongoing relationships). I include Lisa
Bernstein in the "Pennsylvania contingent" because she visited there while working
on her Symposium contribution, and I am freely speculating about institutional
influences.
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highly relevant to those they regulate (contra Ellickson), and
nonetheless the regulated parties prefer ex ante to keep the two
domains independent and distinct (contra Cooter). This complex
position emerges because state law and social norms have different
substantive characteristics, at least in the com-mercial context: To
borrow from sociologists of law, state law is "cold," social norms are
"warm."4 Hence different phases of commercial interaction justify
the application of different principles; social norms for ongoing
relationships, state law for endgames. Commercial actors bargain
in the shadow of both regimes, but to unify these regimes-by letting
one subordinate the other-would be to undermine the overall
efficiency of commercial transactions.
Cass Sunstein's article presents a fourth and wholly different
view. Drawing more on the domain of general public-policy than
that of commercial exchange, Sunstein emphasizes state law as an
instrument for the production and reshaping of social norms.5 This
view pictures law and norms as neither independent nor easily
separated. Sunstein instead envisions two mutually constituted
realms, though he focuses primarily on one direction of that
influence: that of law on norms. This interdependence I want to
explore a bit further.
I share many of Sunstein's views about the need for both
positive and normative legal theory to embrace a more complex
appreciation of the interdependence between law and social
norms.6 This intertwining can be approached in different ways for
different purposes: as the dependence of individual rationality
upon social norms; as the connection between personal preferences
4 See INCA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECTJUSTICE: AN EAST-WEST GERMAN DIARY 44,55
(1995).
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996).
6 See generally Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 711, 749-51 (1994) (arguing that the
distinction between norms governing legitimate state action in different spheres
should play a more direct role in constitutional adjudication); Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, "and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-16 (1993)
(arguing that many constitutionally recognized harms are best understood as involving
expressive injuries rather than more narrowly understood material injuries); Richard
H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politis, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2151 (1990) (arguing
that appropriate reasons to justify actions must take account of expressive concerns
as well as more consequentialist concerns).
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and social norms; or as the need to evaluate and understand actions
not just in terms of the more familiar material consequences they
produce, but also in terms of what those actions are perceived to
mean. Given my basic agreement with Sunstein about the limita-
tions of current legal thought in these respects, I will focus here on
two points. First, I want to clarify the claim being made to avoid
certain common misunderstandings. Second, and more centrally,
I want to turn Sunstein's article on its head a bit and explore a
darker side to the interrelationship between state law and social
norms. I am interested in what might be called law's norm-destroying
capacity, rather than its norm-producing capacity. If law and public
policy influence social norms in ways Sunstein suggests, this
influence will not necessarily be an optimistic, productive one. By
the norm-destroying capacity of law, I mean nothing as profound as
Robert Cover's vision of the "jurispathic" quality of state law's
destruction of competing subcultural value systems.7 My focus is
on the more quotidian ways in which state law can undermine
general, yet crucial, social norms-norms ironically necessary for the
effective realization of state law itself.
I. LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF STATE
ATTENTION TO SOCIAL NORMS
First, arguments of the kind Sunstein offers for greater attention
to the effect of law on norms are often mistaken as justifications for
a more expansive conception of the proper ends of government. To
note that law influences norms, and that norms influence the
effectiveness of laws, is taken as tantamount to arguing that
government should directly pursue norm manipulation as one of its
ends. Such a view raises the specter of an "industrial policy for
norm generation," as one participant at this Symposium put it, or
the specter of precisely the kind of oppressive state that liberal-
ism as a political philosophy was meant to avert. To avoid these
dangers, critics might argue, government should stay out of the
business of norm manipulation altogether.
I think Sunstein's arguments are best cast in different and more
limited terms. To begin, the argument is as much descriptive as
normative. Those of us who have urged greater attention to the
expressive dimensions of law and public policy consider it inevitable
" See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 160-68 (1983).
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that "cultural consequences" as well as "instrumental consequences"
are at stake when government acts.' Ignoring the way law works on
background norms simply is not an option, at least in many
contexts. Behavior is guided not just by formal rules, but by the
interaction between such rules and beliefs, social norms, values,
cognitive means of processing information, psychological frames,
and other factors. At the extreme, laws will be self-defeating when
they undermine social norms whose maintenance turns out to be
necessary to makes those very laws effective.9 Even for purely
predictive purposes, policymakers must be aware of the way state-
generated rules and social norms are likely to influence each other.
If to say government should avoid norm manipulation means that
policymakers should ignore the full range of consequences their
decisions will have, such a wilful self-blinding would hardly enhance
the success of public policies.
This point has implications for the tension between economists
and others within law schools. In a meditative essay, Avery Katz
argues that this tension stems from a "cultural clash" between the
largely empiricist, predictive aims of economics and the more
normative aspirations of disciplines like law. "[E]conomists are
unified in their commitment to positivism and to the idea that one
can usefully proceed while putting normative issues to one side, and
lawyers are not." ° There is something to this idea, but it might
better explain the initial resistance to economics in law schools a
generation ago, rather than today. Many contemporary critics do
not challenge the positivism of economics per se. Rather, the
principal concern is that economic analysis of law sometimes
becomes bad positivism." When rational-choice models of social
I See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89
MICH. L. REV. 936, 938 (1991).
' After presenting this Comment, I came across a similar idea in Philip Pettit's The
Cunning of Trust, in which he argues that "certain intrusive forms of regulation can
be counter-productive and can reduce the level of performance in the very area that
they are supposed to affect .... If heavy regulation is capable of eradicating overtures
of trust, and of driving out opportunities for trusting relationships, then it is capable
of doing great harm." Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202,
225 (1996).
10 Avery Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 85 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcomingJune, 1996) (manuscript at 29).
" As an example, I take this to be the point of David Charny's withering critique
of Thomas Philipson and Richard Posner's prescriptions for public-health policy
regarding AIDS. See David Charny, Economics of Death, 107 HARv. L. REV. 2056, 2080
(1994) (reviewing TOMASJ. PHIIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993)) ("Private
DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
interaction or economic approaches to law prescribe policy based
on assumptions of a sharp separation between law and norms, they
are likely to predict behavior poorly and channel policy in mis-
guided directions. Simply at the level of understanding behavior
sufficiently well to make sensible policy, policymakers must take
account of the way that law and norms interact.
In addition, I do not think arguments like Sunstein's should be
taken in the direction of licensing government pursuit of norm
modification in and of itself. That is, attention to the expressive
dimensions of public policy and law should not be understood to
supplant or clash with prior frameworks justifying state action and
defining its boundaries. As an example from within political
liberalism, if Mill's "harm to others" principle is taken to represent
the prerequisite for justified state coercion, Sunstein's arguments
should not be understood to modify that principle. Instead, they
are better understood as operating within it. Government action is
still justified only when "harm to others" occurs; once that precondi-
tion has been met, however, the most effective way of regulating
that harm might well require taking account of the way laws and
norms interact. But a bare governmental interest in regulating
social norms intrinsically-in "making a statement"-should not in
and of itselfjustify coercive forms of state action, such as criminaliza-
tion, that would not be independently justified within the appropri-
ate political philosophy.12  Arguments that require sophisticated
policymakers to attend to the cultural as well as the instrumental
consequences of policy need not justify an "industrial policy for
norm generation."" Sunstein is right to emphasize the interde-
Choices provides yet another example of economic analysis distorted by faulty
normative and methodological premises.").
12 Government might, however, properly pursue more purely expressive ends
when it acts through means other than coercion, such as education or perhaps
subsidization. See, e.g.,JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 420 (1986) ("[T]he
harm principle allows perfectionist policies so long as they do not require resort to
coercion. It deserves its place as a liberal principle of freedom not because it is anti-
perfectionist.... [but because] it sets a limit on the means allowed in pursuit of
moral ideals."). For legal analysis of the different constraints on government as
coercive regulator versus government as educator, see MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 214
(1983) (asserting that the Establishment Clause "is the only substantive constitutional
constraint on what government may say"). For an interesting defense of perfectionist
liberalism that respects these liberal constraints, see Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism,
Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 394-400 (1996).
s In an article that shares much of Sunstein's concerns with the expressive
dimensions of public policy, Dan Kahan takes what I read as a contrary view on this
20591996]
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pendence of state law and social norms; but stressing this relation-
ship need not raise certain commonly invoked specters of boundless
and oppressive state efforts to manipulate social norms unanchored
in a larger political philosophy that defines the appropriate limits of
state action.
II. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND STATE LAW
Once state law and social norms are seen as interdependent,
their interrelationship might take many forms. We might think of
these as parallel systems of social control, which operate with
indifference to each other. We might think of the two systems as
Sunstein does, with law working productively to draw on or
influence social norms in ways that make law more effective. But I
want to emphasize the capacity of state law to destroy social norms
in ways that undermine both law and norms. The post-New Deal
regulatory state is so pervasive that we might think it has squeezed
out any significant role for social norms. But even in the modern
administrative state, norms continue to be central means of creating
and sustaining social, economic, and political interaction.
14
Moreover, failure to appreciate the place of norms within a system
of state law can lead law into a destructive relationship with these
important norms. To see this destructive possibility, I begin with
the lessons a variety of disciplines recently have offered on the
continuing significance of social norms.
point. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming, Spring 1996). Kahan accepts the view that concern for the expressive
dimensions of action can in principle justify the criminalization of conduct that is
purely expressive, that is, conduct that does not violate Mill's "harm to others"
principle, such as, arguably, consensual acts of sex between adults of the same sex.
See id. (manuscript at 9). Kahan then argues against criminalization of such conduct
not in principle, but on the ground that such regulation would make the wrong
substantive statement. See id. (manuscript at 9-10). I would not go this far because
I would not abandon the traditional liberal view that state coercion is justified only
when "harm to others" occurs; I do not think attention to the expressive dimensions
of public policy and law should be understood to dash with or undermine the general
framework of liberal political justification for state action.
14 For a somewhat different perspective on this point, see generally WILI.AM I.
MILLER, HUMILIATION (1993), which argues that much of social interaction is
governed by more traditional norms, such as those of honor and reciprocity, even in
the face of the pervasive, modern regulatory state. See, e.g., id. at 51-52 ("[D]espite
the claims of the law, the state, and certain religions, within certain groupings we still
live as if we were people of honor .... Amazingly, in spite of the reputed all-
intrusive evil hegemony of modern institutions, we still manage to create spaces for
ourselves within which we function rather preindustrially for all that.").
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Paradoxically, rational-choice theory and collective-action theory
have done much to bring out the dependence of effective collective
action upon norms of cooperation. 5 The practice of cooperation,
grounded in norms of reciprocity, must be robust precisely because
short-term self-interest presents so many occasions for opportunistic
action. Potential prisoners' dilemmas emerge everywhere; if third-
party enforcement, in the form of state laws and state execution of
those laws, were the principal tool for surmounting these dilemmas,
the state would have to become even more pervasive. But the more
closely we examine social interactions, the more we notice the
extent to which decentralized extra-state "enforcement" fills this
gap; 16 social norms, particularly norms of reciprocity, sustain
practices of cooperation enforced through private action. Indeed,
if we could somehow quantify potential prisoners' dilemmas and
compare those surmounted through effective norms and those
through formal state laws, it seems likely that norms would dwarf
state enforcement in importance. Rational-choice scholarship has
little to say about how such norms arise, but it does recognize that
once they do arise they might be self-sustaining as long as coopera-
tion is reciprocated."
A striking concrete example comes from "perhaps the most
influential book ever written on cities."18 Jane Jacob's detailed
mosaic of city life, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, opens
with three chapters devoted to the function of sidewalks. 9 Jacobs
argues that safety and comfort on the streets is the crucial factor in
making some districts vital in urban areas and others desolate; she
's For one of the best studies of these issues, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION 3 (1982). For the argument that noncooperation is the dominant strategy of
outcome-oriented rational actors, seeJoN ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY
OF SOCIAL ORDER 203 (1989).
16 For a critique of "legal centrism," the view that problems of private ordering
necessarily require state intervention, particularly in the form of command-and-
control type regulation, see Cooter, supra note 2, at 1644-46.
1 In political science, the standard reference for the mathematical demonstration
of this point is ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 173-75, 177
(1984). For concrete case studies, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACION 184 (1990) ("When
individuals have lived in such situations for a substantial time [situations in which they
can communicate, interact, and develop trust] and have developed shared norms and
patterns of reciprocity, they possess social capital with which they can build
institutional arrangements for resolving CPR [common pool resource] dilemmas.").
" Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Pan-
handlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 n.22 (1996).
"JANEJACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
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then asks what conditions make streets safe or not. Formal law-
enforcement can play only a minimal role-particularly in the
intricate ways that make certain neighborhoods thrive, while others
stagnate. There simply are not enough police to go around, nor,
even in these days of community policing, would we want there to
be. As Jacobs puts it, order is maintained more through social
policing than state policing.21 In healthy neighborhoods, those
with a specific stake in the streets, such as shopkeepers, and those
drawn to the street to shop, gossip, and watch others, maintain
order in numerous and complex ways.2 ' This informal enforce-
ment of norms is particularly noteworthy because it does not take
place within the kind of close-knit, solidaristic groups sometimes
envisioned as necessary to sustain informal norms. 22 Norm enforce-
ment is too pervasive to be sustainable only in such exceptional
circumstances. In thriving districts, even more diffusely linked
groups with less densely structured interactions nonetheless enforce
norms of "reasonable street use" that sustain a local system of social
order.
A similar point about the dependence of formal policies on
effective background norms is emerging from studies of the
differential success economists are having in aiding the transition in
various post-socialist countries "from Marx to markets." 23 Simply
transposing Western regimes of free contract and private property,
along with the institutional framework that undergirds these
regimes, such as recording systems, has not been similarly successful
in different countries in enabling well-functioning market systems.
In some places, businesses exploit customers for short-term gains
but at long-term reputational costs that they have failed thus far to
appreciate; in others, store clerks have to be trained to be attentive
20 See id. at 31-32 ("[Sidewalk and street peace] is kept primarily by an intricate,
almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people
themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.... No amount of police can
enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down.");
see also Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 221 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) ("Societies which rely
heavily on the use of force are likely to be less efficient, more costly, and more
unpleasant that those where trust is maintained by other means.").
21 Ellickson additionally emphasizes informal social controls on street behavior:
"an orderly user of a public space routinely evaluates not only disorderly people but also other
orderly people who could enforce norms there." Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1197.
" See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1706 (1996).
'I borrow the phrase from a course of that name, on economies in transition,
that Robert Ellickson and Michael Heller taught initially at Yale Law School.
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to customers rather than insulting to them.24 As Carol Rose puts
it, summarizing some of these findings, "capitalist property has a
kind of moral and cultural infrastructure that we may have mistak-
enly thought was simply natural, whereas in fact it is learned
through sustained commercial practice, and lost when those
practices deteriorate." 25  Among other qualities, this structure
includes the ability to generate confidence and trust in cooperative
relationships, or a shared acceptance of cultural lines such as those
between theft and legitimate market competition, or a recognition
of shared ground rules within which competition appropriately takes
place.26
These two examples, one of local neighborhood success, the
other of successful economic systems, suggest that background
social norms are as important as the formal apparatus of the state
in sustaining successful patterns of interactions across many
spheres. Loosely put, these background norms might be described
as norms of reciprocity: norms that sustain what is perceived to be
"a fair system of cooperation over time."27  As the philosopher
Allan Gibbard puts it, many of the chief moral sentiments upon
2'4 Reports detailing these practices are discussed in Carol Rose, Propter Honoris
Respectum: Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,354 nn.142-44
(1996).
' Id. at 354. James Krier has long critiqued the failure of some economic analysis
of property regimes to recognize that state enforcement of private property rights
itself requires commitments to cooperation. See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the
Commons (pt. 2), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 338 n.44 (1992) ("[A] private
property regime can only be achieved through cooperation, yet the absence of
cooperation is the very problem that [some economic analysts] thought private
property developed to solve.").
2 On the role of trust in sustaining commercial relationships, see, for example,
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY
8 (1995) (attributing economic success in enterprises to situations in which "economic
actors supported one another because they believed that they formed a community
based on mutual trust"); Charles F. Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Co-
operation in a Volatile Economy, in INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC
REGENERATION 215, 229-30 (Frank Pike & Werner Sengenberger eds., 1992)
(describing the success of an economic development project in Pennsylvania).
" The phrase recurs throughout much of the political philosophy ofJohn Rawls.
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16 (1993) (arguing that "[flair terms of
cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity"). Indeed, the animating idea of Rawls's
political philosophy, "justice as fairness," is precisely the idea of society as a fair
system of cooperation among free and equal persons. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OFJUSTICE 11-17(1971). For a significant recent effort in legal scholarship to develop
the concept of reciprocity as the central organizing ideal of a body of formal state
law-in this case, tort law, see GREGORY C. KEATING, REASONABLENESS AND
RATIONALITY IN NEGLIGENCE THEORY 311 (1996).
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which norms depend "are reciprocal overtly: a sense of fair dealing,
feelings of gratitude, urges to retaliate."
28
These norms of reciprocity can further be disaggregated into
two types. One is specific or local reciprocity; this is the kind
Axelrod addresses, which sustains ongoing relationships between
specific parties. 29 This is reciprocity as mutual exchange in direct,
one-to-one interactions. Reciprocity of this kind is specific to the
ongoing dynamic interactions within a particular relationship. The
second might be called generalized reciprocity. This is a more
global predisposition to be motivated by norms of reciprocity and
cooperation even when acting in new settings or with new agents
outside some previously established relationship. From another
disciplinary angle, Alexis de Tocqueville, still the most incisive
sociologist of democracy, noticed mechanisms in well-functioning
democracies through which specific reciprocity gets transformed
into generalized reciprocity. Observing democracy for the first
time, de Tocqueville was primarily concerned that American
equality, unlike the social and political order of his own, aristocratic
France, would make people more inward-focused-not selfish, but
more independent and atomistic3 0 For de Tocqueville, the great
danger of democracies is that individualism will produce a passive
citizenry prone to despotic takeover." But he observes that
democracies succeed in drawing people out of their individualism
through the recognition that self-interest itself requires acknowl-
edgement of mutual dependence: "Men learn to think of their
fellow men from ambitious motives."12 From this starting point,
de Tocqueville articulates a mechanism through which local acts of
cooperation become generalized toward a more public-regarding
disposition necessary to avoid the distinctly democratic dangers of
rampant individualism: "Men attend to the interests of the public,
first, by necessity, afterwards by choice; what was intentional
2
8 
ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGMENT 261 (1990).
29 See AXELROD, supra note 17, at 60 (noting that "[ilt is easier to maintain the
norms of reciprocity in a stable small town or ethnic neighborhood").
" 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 104 (Vintage Books ed.
1945) (1835) ("Individualism [is distinct from selfishness and] is a mature and calm
feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the
mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and friends, so that after he has
thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself.").
" See 2 id. at 109 ("Despotism, then, which is at all times dangerous, is more
particularly to be feared in democratic ages.").
32 2 id. at 110.
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becomes an instinct, and by dint of working for the good of one's
fellow citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them are at length
acquired.""3
While de Tocqueville is best known for his emphasis on the
importance of civil society to democracy-in the form of local,
participatory associations-his account of the causal mechanisms at
work is perhaps less well appreciated. Civic society and local
government are crucial not just because local solutions to local
problems are more likely to be effective, or because the expressive
and psychological benefits of public participation can best be
realized in town meetings. Instead, it is through small-scale
associations that de Tocqueville believes commitments to specific
reciprocity are first developed. But as these habits of cooperation
are formed and experienced, they become generalized into a more
global disposition toward reciprocity. Thus, local participatory
associations become the mechanism for generating general social
norms organized around principles of reciprocity. Local associa-
tions provide the vehicle through which habits of, and dispositions
toward, cooperation are cultivated:
It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him
in the destiny of the state, because he does not clearly understand
what influence the destiny of the state can have upon his own lot.
But if it is proposed to make a road across the end of his estate,
he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small
public affair and his greatest private affairs-this multiplies to an
infinite extent opportunities of acting in concert for all the
members of the community and makes them constantly feel their
mutual dependence 4
To return to the insight of Jane Jacobs and recent experience
with economies in transition from socialism to markets, social
norms of this sort are just as important as formal state laws in
making democratic politics and market institutions effective.
A last vantage point on this relationship between norms and
laws, perhaps the most important, comes from recent work in
comparative political science. Robert Putnam, whose work on
democracy has been compared (with some exaggeration) to that of
de Tocqueville,35 has argued that the amount of "social capital" a
society contains turns out to be the crucial factor in the success of
"s 2 id. at 112.
3' 2 id. at 111.
5 See Civics Lessons: Pro Bono Publico, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at 96, 96.
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its political and economic institutions.-" Social capital includes
features of social organization, such as strong social norms of trust
and cooperation, as well as effective structures and networks of
"civic engagement" within which these norms can develop and be
sustained, that improve the efficiency of society by encouraging
coordinated actions." Social capital can be analogized to other
forms of capital; like physical assets a borrower puts up to secure a
loan, social capital can serve as a kind of collateral. As the
economist Kenneth Arrow has put it, and as other papers in this
Symposium emphasize, "[v]irtually every commercial transaction has
within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted
over a period of time.""8 The more one can offer credible commit-
ments to behave in a trustful way, for example by respecting norms
of reciprocity such as fair dealing, the less financial capital one
needs to secure a loan.
Putnam's signal contribution was to offer striking empirical
confirmation of the role of social capital. He compared regional
governments across Italy that operated with high degrees of
autonomy since the early 1970s. After determining which of these
regions were most successful, both in terms of the perceived
legitimacy of its political institutions and the performance of its
economy, Putnam examined numerous possible theories that might
account for the differential patterns of success. He concluded that
the most important predictive and causal factor in these patterns
was the level of social capital-the measurable strength of norms of
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. "Virtually without
exception, the more civic the context, the better the govern-
ment." 9 Or as Putnam puts it in a more provocative phrase,
"[g]ood government in Italy is a by-product of singing groups and
soccer clubs ... "40
36 ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIvic TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993).
" Id. at 167. The concept of "social capital" was first developed extensively in
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SoCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990).
' KennethJ. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 343, 357 (1972).
See generally Bernstein, supra note 2.
s PUTNAM, supra note 36, at 182.
4 Id. at 176. In subsequent essays, Putnam has argued that the United States has
seen a serious decline in social capital over the last generation, with major
implications for politics and markets. See Robert Putnam, The Strange Disappearance
of Civic America, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1996, at 34; Robert Putnam Responds, AM.
PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 26.
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In thinking about the relationship between norms and law, then,
the first point is that norms of reciprocity, and the conditions
necessary to facilitate their development and maintenance, are as
important as formal laws to the success of democratic politics and
free markets. The second point, which Sunstein emphasizes, is that
formal law and such norms are not independent of and irrelevant
to each other; laws can structure and influence these norms, a fact
to which wise policymakers must attend. And the third point, to
which this Comment now turns, is that this relationship can be a
destructive one. In several ways, state law can unintentionally
undermine the social capital that turns out to be so central to the
vitality of well-functioning political and economic systems.
III. STATE DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
I will offer three brief accounts of ways in which law and policy
can destroy social capital. These are skeletal accounts, meant to be
exemplary and suggestive.
A. Destroying the Social Conditions that Enable Reciprocity
After portraying the role of social policing in the vitality of city
neighborhoods, Jane Jacobs turns to an indictment of the kind of
modern urban planning that began in the 1950s and continues to
some extent today.41 Jacobs argues that certain structural condi-
tions are necessary to enable the kind of street interactions that
generate norms of informal social policing: (1) facilities must be
available that attract people to the street, like bars, restaurants,
grocery stores; (2) the proprietors of these entities must develop
specific interest in policing the street; (3) these places must then
attract people to the streets, which gives yet others who like "people
watching" a further reason to populate the streets. Streets become
filled with people, some of whom are watchers, some of whom are
being watched. This social structure works best when it is largely
unconscious; people populate the street and watch the street
because it is fun, and may be only dimly aware that they are also
keeping order.
42
41 SeeJACOBS, supra note 19, at xiv ("[A]nticity planning remains amazingly sturdy
in American cities. It is still embodied in thousands of regulations, bylaws, and codes,
also in bureaucratic timidities owing to accepted practices, and in unexamined public
attitudes hardened by crime.").
42 See id. at 73 ("The trust of a city street is formed over time from many, many
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Jacobs argues that technically trained experts on city planning
rarely understand this fact because they do not understand how
social norms control the vibrancy and safety of streets. Redevelop-
ment projects in the last generation were built on the assumption
that people want order and quiet; they were built away from the
street and left open spaces below ("islands within the city"43)
without places to congregate. One result was that the only contact
people could have required greater personal intrusion; one had to
be invited into an apartment for a cup of coffee, because no nearby
public places existed for more casual contact. Faced with such all
or nothing choices, the most common result was that people chose
to have no contact at all with neighbors.44 Areas with extremely
high dwelling densities, like Boston's North End, were viewed
during the heyday of urban planning as overcrowded slums, in need
of renovation.45  Streets come to lack a public life precisely
because such a life was perceived as dangerous; a vibrant street life
was the very thing orthodox urban planning essentially sought to
avoid.
In contrast, Jacobs argues that dense concentrations of people
are a necessary condition for flourishing neighborhoods and safe
streets.46 The least safe places are, in fact, those with a low density
of dwellings.4  Rather than isolating people, the aim of city design
ought to be to find ways for people to flow together and have many
points of contact on the streets.48 The norms of mutual trust and
cooperation so crucial to the social (as opposed to state) policing
that ultimately determines the safety of streets cannot be developed
in the absence of structural features that encourage sufficiently
dense and repeated social interactions. Ironically, in their efforts
to create safe neighborhoods, expert planners redesigned areas of
cities in ways that undermined the sites needed to enable norms of
cooperation and trust to emerge.
The point can be generalized: In Jacobs's account, repeated
street encounters are the equivalent of Putnam's "networks of civic
engagement." As long as policymakers remain fixated on formal
policies and official state laws, they will fail to see the central role
little public sidewalk contacts.").
41 Id. at 61.
44 See id. at 85.
45 See id. at 42-43, 265.
46 See id. at 267.
47 See id. at 267-68.
41 See id. at 238.
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that more informal social norms play in underwriting social,
economic, and political order. Not recognizing the cost of doing so,
policymakers can destroy the structural conditions that enable these
networks of civic engagement to flourish, thereby diminishing the
ability to develop the requisite norms of trust and cooperation.
Because social capital is crucial to the success of formal state
policies, these policymaking decisions necessarily become self-
defeating. Thus, one way state law can interact destructively with
social norms-in ways that undermine the aims of state law itself-is
through destroying the social conditions necessary to enable
relevant norms of reciprocity and cooperation to flourish.
B. Direct Attacks on Norms of Reciprocity
State laws can also attack central social norms more directly.
Consider an influential economic analysis of the vexing problem of
legal transition policy. The transition problem is whether govern-
ment should have an obligation to compensate those who are
disadvantaged by changes in regulatory policy that are, on balance,
desirable. Traditionally, government has been thought to have
distinct obligations to compensate for some harms it inflicts on
innocent private actors; these obligations are embodied in constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Takings Clause and the Contracts
Clause. 49  But approaching the problem through the lens of
economics, Louis Kaplow argues that such harms should go
uncompensated except in exceptional circumstances not present in
most traditional cases of court-ordered compensation. 0
The key move in Kaplow's argument is that all declines in the
value of current property holdings should be treated the same,
whatever the source imposing the loss in value. Thus, "[a] private
49 See e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (takings). For a
view of the Contracts Clause which emphasizes its role in preserving what today might
be called social capital, see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 354-55
(1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution recognized that
government interference with norms of contract would "destroy all confidence
between man and man," would "sap the morals of the people," and would "destroy
the sanctity of private faith").
-' See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv.
509,530 (1986) (arguing that people should anticipate and prepare for the possibility
that government actions will adversely affect their investments in the same way that
"investors in land or equipment located in a high-risk earthquake or flood zone
should take into account the possibility that their project will be destroyed"). For a
more detailed critique of this approach to the transitions problem, see Richard H.
Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1533-37 (1992).
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actor should be indifferent as to whether a given probability of loss
will result from the action of competitors, an act of government, or
an act of God .... "" From a purely economic perspective,
according to Kaplow, all economic losses are the same, whatever
their source and whatever the justification for imposing them. For
purposes of public policy, we should therefore analyze them the
same way; we should no more compensate someone for destruction
of their property that occurs through deliberate governmental
action than through natural or market forces.
Yet once we appreciate the importance of social capital, it
becomes easier to explain why legal doctrine in this area has long
resisted the kind of economic approach Kaplow suggests.
52
Government action, unlike natural forces, reflects deliberate and
intentional decisionmaking by a group to inflict burdens on specific
individuals; by imposing exceptionally concentrated burdens on
specific individuals, over and above those widely and more diffusely
distributed burdens, government deliberately violates what might be
considered baseline norms of reciprocity. The social contract might
be understood to require each person to sacrifice roughly propor-
tionately to the sacrifices of others, or to the benefits one receives
from burdens imposed on others; but to require innocent actors
to suffer unusually devastating losses-and to have those losses go
unacknowledged and uncompensated-is another matter. Even if
government must single out individuals for such losses in order to
realize important public goods, the failure of government to
acknowledge that it is imposing exceptional harms generates
additional injuries beyond those directly associated with the decline
in property values. These are the harms associated with what I
would call the destruction of norms of reciprocity, or what Frank
Michelman calls "demoralization costs.""3 They arise when individ-
uals perceive government not to be treating them fairly, that is,
according to general norms that require a fair reciprocity of the
burdens and benefits of government action.
The government's violation of norms of fair dealing is surely
capable of triggering the same kind of intense emotional responses
that attend the sense of being cheated anywhere else. 54 As long as
s Kaplow, supra note 50, at 534 n.70.
52 For a similar economic analysis to that of Kaplow, see Robert L. Hale, Value and
Vested Rights, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 528 (1927).
" Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of Yust Compensation'Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
54 See GIBBARD, supra note 28, at 261 ("We loathe being cheated, often far more
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any parcel of property is burdened roughly as intensively as
comparable parcels, government regulation can be seen as part of
a system of cooperation on mutually fair terms. That is what
respect for reciprocity entails. But if government singles out
isolated property holders for devastating losses, and then treats
them as if they have suffered something akin to a natural disaster,
an additional violation occurs. The role of compensation now
becomes easier to see: Compensation is best understood as an
expression of government's recognition that its actions violate these
norms of reciprocity, even if those actions nonetheless serve worthy
public goals.55 Compensation is thus a means for government to
acknowledge the continuing force of norms of reciprocity. In other
words, when desirable legal transitions take place, the payment of
compensation might be an important means-perhaps the most
effective means-of nonetheless preserving social capital by the
state's expression of respect for the norms of reciprocity at stake.
As concrete confirmation of this expressive role that compensa-
tion plays, consider the findings of those who have studied efforts
in various countries to break up large landholdings and redistribute
land more equitably.56 Across many different countries, the least
successful means of doing so occurs when government simply takes
large parcels of land and redistributes them without paying any
form of compensation; such policies provoke the most violent,
bitter, and alienated responses from wealthy landowning classes. In
contrast, when government takes land but pays compensation, the
compensation rarely comes close to replacing the actual fair market
value of the land, particularly in poor and less developed countries.
Nonetheless, compensation is socially perceived as an acknowledge-
ment that government is overriding valid claims, and a sign of
respect for the harms inflicted. When compensation is paid, even
though it does not reflect a full monetization of the economic loss
involved, land redistribution policies are more widely accepted and
proceed more easily.
Again, the point can be generalized: Many of the norms that
structure traditional legal (and moral) analysis can be made to look
arbitrary from an economic point of view. Distinctions between acts
and omissions, or between active and passive uses of property, or
than our overt losses explain.").
See Pildes, supra note 50, at 1549-54.
The discussion here reports the results of ROY L. PROSTERMAN &JEFFREY M.
RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 194-97 (1987).
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between intending to cause a harm and negligently causing it,
appear to take "functionally" equivalent events and treat them
differently. If the same quantum of damage results, what difference
should it make whether the harm occurs through my wilful act or
my indifferent neglect? Kaplow's critique of conventional transition
and compensation rules is a subset of a more general economic
critique of conventional legal categories.
Yet these kinds of distinctions, and these sorts of legal categori-
zations, remain pervasive in the law despite persistent critiques of
the sort Kaplow offers.5" One explanation for the recalcitrance of
legal analysis to "functional" critiques is that the "arbitrary"
distinctions such critiques ignore-between acts and omissions, for
example-generate the baselines against which norms, such as norms
of reciprocity, trust, and fairness, take on content. "Reciprocity
needs terms of trade."5 8 These baselines provide the necessary
structure within which terms of fairness and cooperation can be
developed and recognized. That is, conventional norms of this sort
enable the formation of social capital; they help us decide what fair
dealing means, whether the bargain being struck is between private
individuals or between individuals and the state.
Attacking these norms as violating economic conceptions of
efficiency can miss the role they play in defining fair reciprocity.
And because we can now more readily see the role that such social
norms play in sustaining both politics and markets, it becomes
easier to recognize the counterproductive nature of attacking these
norms in the name of efficiency. Robust norms of reciprocity
enable cooperation on terms perceived as fair, and the ability of
societies to sustain this kind of cooperation-even more, perhaps,
than the content of their formal law-accounts for the success of
political institutions and economic systems.5 9 Social capital can be
diminished through policies that directly undermine these norms.
Thus, another means by which legal doctrine and public policy can
interact destructively with social norms is through "rationalizing"
formal state action in "functional" terms. Such terms can fail to
5' For a wonderful demonstration of the pervasiveness across an extraordinary
array of legal fields of these kind of distinctions, see LEO KATZ, ILL-GorrEN GAINS
(1996). The theme of Katz's book is that the fact that these distinctions recur so
pervasively indicates that the distinctions track central moral concerns and that
economic efforts to rationalize these areas are troubling precisely because they fail
to appreciate the power of these concerns.
s GIBBARD, supra note 28, at 261.
s9 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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appreciate the way traditional legal distinctions provide landmarks
that help organize the norms of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust
that enable the formation of social capital.
C. Differences Between the Enforcement of
Norms and the Enforcement of Laws
A third way law can interact destructively with social norms is
through failing to appreciate the complexity of the overall systems
through which norms are created, enforced, and changed. Even
when sophisticated policymakers attempt to follow the path Sunstein
lays out and seek to draw on background norms to make public
policy more effective, the failure to recognize the dynamic and
structural characteristics of social norms as a system of social
control can lead to policies that undermine this normative system.
Social norms should not be viewed as just a set of substantive rules;
they include further rules or practices regarding the most appropri-
ate remedies for violations of these substantive norms. They also
include norms of enforcement, including norms analogous to the
state's "prosecutorial discretion." Yet when policymakers envision
incorporating norms into state laws, they might too readily
incorporate only the substance of social norms without recognizing
that those norms are given content in practice through further
norms about proper remedies and enforcement.
Consider the procedural and contextual constraints when the
enforcement of norms takes place socially, outside of formal state
control. Norms are created and enforced through a myriad of
micro-interactions. At its best, this system of social norms possesses
a variety of characteristics that might be difficult for the state to
duplicate. First, the substance of norms or their application can be
finely calibrated to different local communities-the workplace, the
school, the household, the church, the street. Second, norms can
allow for widespread participation in enforcement (although they do
not always work this way); anyone can mock, ignore, reprimand, roll
his or her eyes, and enforce norms in other ways. Third, the range
of responses available may enable enforcement to be tailored to
subtle differences in the contexts of violations; the subtlety of
enforcement mechanisms enables highly nuanced distinctions
between types of violations. Some violations can produce ironic
laughter; others, social ostracism; still others, physical blows.
Finally, and relatedly, norm enforcement is highly decentralized,
which enables local variation in interpretation and enforcement.
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To be sure, this is a particularly optimistic sketch of the
system of social norms. As Eric Posner and David Charny point
out in their contributions to this Symposium, social norms need
not be efficient and should not be exalted above intentionally
adopted rules or state policies without examination on a norm-by-
norm basis.' Much of state law involves challenging, for good
reasons, long-entrenched norms. But the point is that the substan-
tive rules reflected in social norms are embedded within a larger
system of social norms regarding what we might call jurisdiction,
legislative process, fair notice, prosecutorial discretion, transition
policy, equitable exceptions, and the like. Government incorpora-
tion of the substance of social norms into state policies is perhaps
not likely to take this procedural-institutional framework into
account. Yet given legal realist insights into the relationship
between rights and remedies, government efforts -to influence
norms through law must take this larger system of social norms as
a whole into account. If the state cannot replicate the flexibility and
subtlety of the procedural-institutional structure within which
substantive norms are given content, that should give policymakers
pause before rushing to embrace an effort to shape norms through
law.
Consider a concrete example. Within many (but as Hugh Grant
attests, not all) social circles, there are norms against seeking sex
from prostitutes. This norm is enforced only minimally through
formal law enforcement; the primary enforcement mechanism is
social, such as gossip, ostracism, scorn, and the like. Indeed, this
norm might well be enforced through a relatively finegrained
network of sanctions that are considered appropriately severe, but
not inappropriately so, within different communities. But in some
communities, local governments are now seeking to incorporate this
norm and some of the social-sanctioning mechanisms for enforce-
ment into public policies-in particular, through publishing the
names of "Johns" in local newspapers that circulate in the com-
munity. The effort here is for the law to piggyback onto the
authority of social norms by invoking the sanction of public
humiliation to enforce the legal prohibition.
When this norm is enforced only socially, distinctions might be
drawn between those who are known to frequent prostitutes
regularly and those whose one-time conduct is known only, say, to
6 See David Charny, Illusions of Spontaneous Order Norms in Contractual Relation.
ships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996); Posner, supra note 22.
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a spouse. Moreover, a woman who learns of her partner's violation
of this norm has some control over how to respond to the violation;
whether the relevant sanctions will be confined to the couple
themselves, or whether she will reveal it more generally by, for
example, leaving the relationship and announcing the violation as
her reason. If she decides that disclosure is too embarrassing to
herself and others, she might choose not to disclose.
Once the state decides to enforce this norm through shaming
techniques that appear similar to those of the social-norm sanction-
ing system, though, the state might well not incorporate the entire
procedural-institutional framework within which the norm would be
given content were enforcement left outside the state. Thus,
government officials will perhaps require publication for each
arrest, without more calibrated distinctions among contexts. And
this might lead to counterproductive results for the very people who
are supposed to be among the beneficiaries of such governmental
policies.
Thus according to one newspaper account of such a program in
Ohio, publication of the name of a man found soliciting a prostitute
humiliated not only him, but created additional and much more
public humiliation for his wife.61 Moreover, their children learned
of the conduct and were humiliated as well.62 This public humilia-
tion can change the norms now confronting the wife trying to
decide what to do; her failure to take dramatic public action, such
as leaving the husband or forcing him out of the house, might be
seen as a further loss of face. And the more public the punish-
ments, the more the children become aware of their father's
conduct. The flexibility the aggrieved partner and friends might
otherwise have in dealing with the violation, in which the response
can be tailored to the specific context, can quickly become lost once
the state tries to lend a hand to the relevant norms through
techniques like mandated publication.
Those who urge more self-conscious efforts to use law to
influence norms, or to incorporate norms into law, need to
recognize the overall system of rules, remedies, and enforcement
techniques that constitute social norms as a system of social control.
Failure to appreciate the system within which substantive norms are
embedded can lead policymakers to undermine the very norms they
61 See John Hopkins, Publishing Names of Johns' Punishes Families, Wife Says, CIN.
ENQUIRER, Apr. 18, 1996, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cinnqr.
62 See id.
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seek to enhance, or to compromise other values. This is not to
reject the project Sunstein recommends, but only to caution against
an easily obscured darker side it might have. Good faith efforts to
make law more attentive to social norms can, paradoxically, weaken
the very norms at stake.
CONCLUSION: LAW AND NORMS REVISITED
As the limits on the effectiveness of formal law and public policy
become more apparent, we are becoming increasingly aware of the
central role social norms play in enabling and stabilizing productive
social interaction-whether in the economic sphere, the political
arena, or the social realm. Economic analysis and rational-choice
modelling have pointed out the pervasiveness of the potential for
opportunistic self-regarding action that diminishes overall social
welfare. But if prisoners' dilemmas confront us at every turn, the
solution is not omnipotent state enforcement of formal rules that
seek to surmount these dilemmas. Instead, informal norms will
have to bear much of the burden of ensuring productive coopera-
tion rather than collectively self-destructive exploitation. In
particular, norms of reciprocity help provide the baseline framework
that structures, organizes, and facilitates cooperation and thereby
enables trust to arise and be sustained. Whether the problem is the
safety and vitality of city neighborhoods, or the success of market
economies and democratic politics, the right social norms will be
just as critical to ensuring well-functioning systems as formal state
policies.
More generally, social capital-strong norms of cooperation and
trust, as well as effective structures and networks of civic engage-
ment within which these norms can be developed and sus-
tained-underwrites the successful enforcement of formal state
policy. Once this interdependence is seen, it becomes tempting to
use law to influence norms. This is the direction Sunstein seeks to
take the relationship, and I would endorse much of what he
proposes. To the extent behavioral responses to law and policy
inevitably will be filtered through social norms and the cultural
understandings embedded within them, any effective approach to
policymaking will have to take these norms into account. But I want
to offer a cautionary tale as well, for formal law and informal norms
bear a potentially darker and more antagonistic relationship to each
other than the optimistic account Sunstein stresses.
DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
If state law can influence social norms, the relationship can just
as readily become destructive as productive. Actions of the state
can destroy social capital through insufficient appreciation of the
role social capital plays and the mechanics of its maintenance. This
Comment has suggested three examples of means by which law can
undermine social capital: (1) indirectly, by destroying the structural
conditions necessary to enable norms of cooperation to arise-as in
the case of urban renewal projects; (2) directly, by attacking norms
of reciprocity through efforts to "rationalize" conventional legal
practices with more "functional" analyses that dissolve traditional
distinctions such as those between government-imposed harms and
privately-imposed harms-as in the case of economic approaches to
the problem of legal transitions; and (8) indirectly, by failing to
recognize that incorporating the substance of social norms into
coercive state regulations may fail to incorporate the remedial
flexibility available when norms are enforced socially rather than
through state laws-as in the case of state-mandated publication of
the names of those who hire prostitutes.
In short, norms play a much greater role than we have realized
before in enabling formal law to be effective, and the system of
social capital is a fragile resource that policymakers must conserve
and enhance even as they inevitably draw on it. Once we recognize
the interdependence of law and norms, it is tempting to see only
one direction of influence, and to seek to use law to shape social
norms. But law can also undermine social norms and destroy social
capital, and those of us concerned with emphasizing the mutually
shaping role of law and norms must be equally attentive to this
destructive capacity of the state.
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